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Overcoming Land Use Localism: How HUD’s New Fair
Housing Regulation Can Push States to Eradicate
Exclusionary Zoning
Thomas Silverstein1
Since 2009, the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
(HUD) and various housing and community development stakeholders have grappled with the question of what it means to affirmatively
further fair housing (AFFH). In some respects, HUD’s publication of
a final AFFH rule on July 16, 2015 was the culmination of that process,2 but the rule did not resolve all outstanding questions. In particular, the one point that has been reiterated by a range of groups with
often competing interests is that no one is entirely clear how the
framework that HUD has developed will work for states.3 To a certain
extent, this gap in understanding is illustrated by the fact that the department still has not published a template for the required Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) for states.4
This purported conundrum should not be hard to solve. The solution is to simply refocus the conversation on two closely related questions. First, what is the identity of the entity that is subject to the duty
to AFFH? Second, what is the scope of that entity’s capacity, both in
terms of planning and implementation? Agonizing over how states fit
into HUD’s regulatory framework is grounded in a misappraisal of the
answers to these two questions.
The answer to the first question is clear-cut: the entity is the state
government as a whole and not the individual lead agency that develops the state’s Consolidated Plan and AFH. Each state government
includes not only its state housing and community development department and its state housing finance agency, it also includes more
far flung executive agencies, the legislative branch, and even the judiciary. If the most effective way to overcome a fair housing issue involves state legislative action, then the state legislature actually has an
obligation to pass a bill and the governor has an obligation to sign it
into law.5
1. Associate Counsel, Fair Housing & Community Development Project,
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
2. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,271, 42,272 (July 16,
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 90, 91, et al.).
3. Id. at 42,278.
4. Id. at 44,290.
5. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 712
F.3d 761, 769-770 (2d Cir. 2013) (“There is, of course, a difference between
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Once it is clear that the state as a whole, not an individual lead
agency, is on the hook,6 the scope of the state’s capability starts to
look quite vast. In light of the United States’ federal system of government, states are arguably the most powerful political entities that exist
in this country; their power has only grown in recent years in light of
Supreme Court decisions limiting the federal government’s powers.7
Subject to a relatively limited set of Constitutional constraints, states
can impose taxes, create new spending programs, exercise the power
of eminent domain, regulate participants in the housing market like
real estate agents and insurance companies, and regulate land use.8
The fact that states have diffused these powers across their component
parts and delegated these powers to local governments is immaterial
to the substance of their legal obligations as HUD grantees.
The twin phenomena of diffusion and delegation, however, are relevant to the question of how to implement policies that would bring a
state into meaningful compliance with the duty to AFFH. For example, although amending a provision of a state’s constitution may accomplish AFFH goals, the perceived difficulty of doing so might
undermine meaningful voluntary compliance from the start. State officials are most likely to take positive steps that are attainable. Creating
unrealistic expectations could incentivize evasive tactics.
Out of this context, there emerges a need for policy solutions that
embody three essential characteristics. First, reforms must provide effective tools for fostering residential racial integration by reducing the
an obligation as a condition of grant funding to adopt specific legislation
and the availability of injunctive relief against individual officials who act in
a manner inconsistent with those obligations. The availability of such relief
is a subject of conjecture at this point although the Second Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s decision that the Westchester County Executive’s
veto of legislation banning discrimination in housing on the basis of lawful
source of income violated a provision of a consent decree between HUD
and the County requiring the latter to promote such legislation suggests
that the duty to AFFH – as embodied in that consent decree – reaches the
affairs of legislators and chief executives in a meaningful way.”).
6. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
7. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012) (holding that the provision of the Affordable Care Act making the expansion of
Medicaid mandatory for the states was unconstitutional coercion in excess
of Congress’s powers under the Spending Clause); U.S. v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that a provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because Congress can only consider the aggregated effects of economic,
rather than noneconomic, activity on interstate commerce); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it lacked “congruence and proportionality” to the
constitutional infirmity being remedied); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995) (holding that a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because it regulated non-commercial activity).
8. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 712 F.3d at 773.
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prevalence of exclusionary zoning. This article focuses narrowly on
exclusionary zoning because it is a widespread practice that has a deep
historical connection to residential racial and ethnic segregation.
Clearly, states will need to develop strategies for addressing other fair
housing challenges, as well. Second, despite requiring statutory
changes, they must be based on proven policies from other states.
Third, their adoption must move the discourse surrounding land use
regulation in a direction where a more dramatic rethinking of the
state’s role is possible. A handful of states have pursued policies that
satisfy these criteria to varying extents.9 California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey all have longstanding statutes that seek to
mitigate exclusionary zoning through some sort of a state role,
whether administrative or judicial.10 Each offers important lessons.
This article elaborates a vision of the specific policy features that
state land use reforms should have in order to embody the three
broad characteristics noted above and play an important role in AFFH
efforts. To do that, the first section of this article explores the legal
basis for this article’s definition of states and the scope of their authority. The second section catalogues the history of exclusionary zoning
and its connection to residential racial segregation. The third section
looks at the policy features, both those found in existing laws and
more innovative solutions that should be part of a state legislative reform package that addresses the AFFH duty. The fourth section situates that package in the context of policy rationales that have
contemporary political salience. Lastly, the article expresses the aspiration that such reforms could contribute to a paradigm shift in the
discourse of land use regulation.
I. The Nature and Power of States as HUD Program Participants
a. Who is the grantee?
The conclusion that states as whole entities, rather than individual
agencies, for purposes of the duty to AFFH is compelled by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, as well as HUD’s regulations implementing Consolidated Planning requirements that
govern the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program,
the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME), and the
Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program.11
Under McKinney-Vento, which authorized the creation of the Emergency Solutions Grant program (ESG – formerly known as the Emergency Shelter Grant), a state is “each of the several States, the District
9. See infra note 9.
10. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65580 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g (2013).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 40B, § 20 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-303
(2015).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 11371(8) (1997); 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (2016).
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of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, The Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
and any other territory or possession of the United States.”12
By contrast, the authorizing statute for the CDBG program, which is
representative of the other two block grant programs, defines a state
more broadly as “any State of the United States, or any instrumentality
thereof approved by the Governor; and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.”13 This definition could arguably support the interpretation that
individual state agencies, rather than state governments as whole entities, are program participants. However, HUD’s regulation implementing the Consolidated Planning requirement attached to those
programs defines states in a manner consistent with McKinneyVento.14 Those regulations have been in place for over six years,
which is the statute of limitations for challenging the validity of regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act.15 As the regulation is
minimally vulnerable to challenge and all states receive ESG allocations that unambiguously carry responsibilities for states as whole entities, the scope of agencies or branches of a state’s government to
which the duty to AFFH applies is clear—it applies to all of them.
b. States in the federal system
States have expansive powers that enable them to pursue a broad
array of policy objectives. Unless a specific constitutional provision
that constrains state action applies or such action is preempted by federal law in an area of federal power, state governments can essentially
legislate on any issue and use any enforcement tool to effectuate that
policy.16 In recent years, state power has grown appreciably as the U.S.
Supreme Court has limited the scope of Congress’s authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause in U.S. v. Lopez, U.S. v. Morrison, City of
Boerne v. Flores, and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.17 The Court’s decisions in these cases all have the effect of limiting the circumstances in which federal law might preempt state law by
12. 42 U.S.C. § 11371(8).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(2) (2007); See also 42 U.S.C. § 12902(9) (2015) (defining the term “state” for purposes of the AIDS Housing Opportunity Act); 42
U.S.C § 12704(2) (2015) (including a similar definition of the term “state”
for purposes of the HOME Investment Partnerships Program).
14. See 24 C.F.R. § 91.5.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2011); Impro Prod., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 850
n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that the statute of limitations for challenges to
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act is six years).
16. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (outlining the scope of the
police power in the federal system while upholding a state law requiring
vaccination for smallpox).
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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invalidating (or finding alternative grounds for sustaining) federal
statutes and, in the case of National Federation of Independent Business,
limiting the power of Congress to use grant conditions to bind states
to requirements that the body could not legislate directly.18
In addition to recent limits on the power of Congress to restrict or
otherwise control the activities of states, the Court has constrained the
ability of private parties to challenge state action as violative of federal
law.19 Three cases are emblematic of this trend. First, in Alexander v.
Sandoval, the Court held that there was no private right of action to
enforce the U.S. Department of Transportation’s regulation for the
disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and articulated a restrictive test, requiring that statutes include
“rights-creating language” for determining whether federal laws are
enforceable by private parties.20 Next, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the
Court short-circuited an attempt to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a right of action for individuals to challenge state action that
violates a federal right, to circumvent its decision in Sandoval.21 The
Gonzaga Court established that the same test applied for determining
whether federal statutes are enforceable through § 1983.22
Lastly, in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, the Court held that
the federal Medicaid statute was not enforceable by private parties,
whether through the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution or
through the inherent equitable powers of the federal courts.23 Actions
to enforce the Medicaid statute historically proceeded under § 1983
until Gonzaga foreclosed that path.24 The Armstrong Court held that
the Supremacy Clause does not provide a private right of action to
enforce federal rights but merely imposes a rule of decision for cases
in which state and federal law conflict.25 The Court stated that, while
the federal courts have equitable powers to enjoin state action that
violates federal rights as in Ex Parte Young, there are limitations on
whether courts should exercise that power that severely restrict its
scope.26 Commentators have observed that the Court appeared to
18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (holding there
was no private right of action to seek injunctive relief with respect to violations of the Medicaid provisions of the Social Security Act); Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (holding that there was no private right of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288, 293 (2001) (holding that there was no private right of action to enforce the Department of
Transportation’s regulation prohibiting policies or practices with discriminatory effects under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
20. 532 U.S. at 288, 293.
21. 536 U.S. at 287.
22. Id. at 302.
23. 135 S. Ct. at 1378.
24. Id. at 1387.
25. Id. at 1383.
26. Id. at 1385.
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bend over backwards to avoid cognizing judicial enforcement of the
Medicaid statute, misapplying its newly articulated test to the facts at
hand.27
Federal authority to adopt laws that might limit state policymaking
and the ability of private parties to enforce what federal laws remain
valid have diminished. This state of affairs has increased the power of
state governments in proportion to that reduction in federal power.
c. States and localism
One of the more common rhetorical tactics of states that are trying
to justify the failure to constrain local authority is that certain areas of
policymaking are the province of exclusive municipal control. The degree of legal foundation for this assertion varies from state to state,
but ultimately the source of all local authority is in state law. In theory,
this means that states –defined broadly to include all of their branches
of government – are responsible for all local decision-making.
Nonetheless, practicalities may intervene and are, at minimum, important for understanding what steps might be necessary in order to
actually implement state land use reforms that mitigate exclusionary
zoning. The primary relevant division among states in initiating that
discussion is whether a state follows the Dillon’s Rule, is a home rule
state, or is somewhere in between those two poles.28 Secondarily,
among home rule states, it is important to determine whether the
source of legal authority for that designation is found in the state constitution, a statute, or the common law. Notwithstanding that the content of a state constitution is within the control of a state, amending a
state constitution in order to allow the state to supersede local land
use regulations would be a more laborious, long-term endeavor than
modifying a statute.
It is helpful to briefly define what these different regimes entail.
Under Dillon’s Rule, the powers of municipalities are limited to those
which the state has explicitly granted or which are necessarily implied
by an explicit grant of authority.29 With respect to local land use regulation, the most common explicit grant of power is a state zoning enabling act.30 States that adhere to Dillon’s Rule may vary somewhat in
how rigorously courts police the limits of local authority, particularly
27. Steve Vladeck, Armstrong: Is Utterly Disingenuous Statutory Interpretation Ever
Worth It?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 31, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/03/armstrong-is-utterly-disingenuous-statu
tory-interpretation-ever-worth-it.html.
28. As of the time of publication, 29 states follow Dillon’s Rule and nine are
strong home rule states. The remaining 12 states have either statutory or
constitutional grants of home rule authority, but either the substantive
scope of that authority is limited or that authority is not granted to all
municipalities.
29. See Arlington Cnty. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Va. 2000).
30. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2280-2316 (2016).
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those which are purported to have been necessarily implied by the
state legislature.31 Under home rule, local governments are generally
presumed to have broad powers.32 However, even in states in which
there is a constitutional basis for home rule, state legislatures may abrogate the authority of home rule municipalities by adopting specific
legislation.33 A very few states, however, impose limits on the types of
laws that state legislatures can pass that limit home rule. For example,
the Kansas Constitution requires that any such laws apply uniformly to
all municipalities.34 Because state legislatures, even in home rule
states, generally can displace local regulatory power by enacting specific laws, it is unlikely that a constitutional amendment would ever be
necessary to set the stage for enhanced state regulation of land use.
Although the law of home rule is an important consideration, so is
the culture. This is the case even in states where there is no longstanding legal authority for home rule. For example, Westchester County
Executive Rob Astorino referred to home rule as a “power long cherished in New York” in arguing against HUD’s attempts to bring the
county into compliance with the duty to AFFH by rooting out exclusionary zoning in affluent, predominantly white municipalities.35 Although the New York State Constitution and the state’s General Laws
have home rule provisions,36 they are relatively limited in scope, stopping short of endowing municipalities with the police power, and of
recent vintage in comparison with other states. Notwithstanding the
state’s home rule laws, its courts continue to articulate Dillon’s Rule in
weighing the scope of local governmental power.37 There is nothing
in New York law that would prevent the state from statutorily imposing
a regime with the power to override local land use decisions.38 Some,
however, would likely see such a law as a significant cultural shift.
31. 528 S.E.2d at 712.
32. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (2014) (“[m]unicipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal
services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law”).
33. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (2016) (limiting municipalities’ home rule
powers to regulations that “are not in conflict with general laws”). However,
a small number of state constitutions impose limits on the types of laws that
state legislatures can pass that limit home rule. See KAN. CONST. art. XXII,
§ 5(b) (2014) (limiting the power of the state legislature to preempt local
home rule to “statutes of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all
cities”).
34. Id. (limiting the power of the state legislature to preempt local home rule
to “statutes of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities”).
35. Alfred Branch, Astorino Defends County on Affordable Housing Efforts, BEDFORDKATONAH PATCH (July 24, 2015), http://patch.com/new-york/bedford/as
torino-defends-county-affordable-housing-efforts.
36. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (2002); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (2011).
37. See Sureway Towing, Inc. v. Martinez, 779 N.Y.S.2d 109, 111 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004).
38. Id.
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II. Exclusionary Zoning, States, and Residential Racial Segregation
a. Early Origins
The problem of residential racial segregation is inextricable from
the history of land use regulation in the United States. Zoning, which
emerged as a widespread practice in the 1910s and 1920s,39 is very
much a product of its time in two meaningful respects. First, zoning
proponents’ attempts to methodologically determine the highest and
best use of land reflected the ideology of the Progressive Era reformers.40 Although zoning ordinances have grown vastly more complicated over time, early ordinances straightforwardly classified parcels of
land with regard to two characteristics: the types of uses allowed and
the intensity of uses permitted.41 These early ordinances also imposed
detailed restrictions on building heights, minimum lot sizes, set-backs,
and other features.42 For example, a zoning ordinance might classify
land into three types of use: R for residential, C for commercial, and I
for industrial. There may be three intensities of use: 1 for low density,
2 for medium density, and 3 for high density. Thus, a parcel zoned R-1
would be restricted to low-density residential use. Second, from the
start, the practice was used to exclude perceived outsiders in terms of
race, national origin, religion, and socioeconomic status.43 Indeed,
even before the advent of traditional zoning, municipalities attempted
to use their regulatory power to allocate space between groups of people on the basis of race.44
A review of two seminal cases that reached the Supreme Court,
Buchanan v. Warley and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., is instructive. In Buchanan, a white property owner sought specific performance
of a contract to sell his property to an African American buyer.45 The
buyer’s obligation to purchase under the contract was contingent on
the ultimate determination of whether he had the right to occupy the
parcel.46 Under Louisville’s local ordinances, it was unlawful for an
African American to reside in a home on a majority-white block.47 The
Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance on the grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by irrationally and unjustifiably restricting the seller’s right to alienate
39. Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, ARIZ.
STATE UNIV., http://www.asu.edu/courses/aph294/total-readings/silver
%20—%20racialoriginsofzoning.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
40. DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY 50-51 (2007) (discussing the “scientific” origins of land use planning).
41. Id. at 82 (describing zoning ordinance of Euclid, Ohio adopted in 1922).
42. Id.
43. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 241-43 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 69 (1917).
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id. at 70-71.
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property.48 Although Louisville’s ordinance was at issue in Buchanan,
that ordinance was reflective of a nationwide trend toward explicit racial zoning reflected in local laws in Baltimore, among other cities.49
Those ordinances quickly fell away after the Court’s decision, and racist local governments looked to other strategies for maintaining residential segregation.50
Traditional zoning, as it developed at that time, proved to be a remarkably effective tool for doing so. New York City adopted the nation’s first zoning ordinance in 1916, just two years before the Court’s
decision in Buchanan, and the practice spread rapidly over the course
of the next two decades.51 In particular, zoning held a strong allure
for newly forming suburban municipalities outside of industrial cities
in the northeast and Midwest.52 The populations of these cities were
booming at the time due to a combination of European immigration
(prior to the adoption of restrictive laws in 1921 and 1924), and the
first Great Migration of African Americans from the rural South, beginning just before World War I.53 In the wake of World War I, nativist
and white supremacist sentiment were at their height, Prohibition became the law of the land, and the Ku Klux Klan expanded from a
regional to a national political force.54 In this context, economically
mobile white Protestants effectively used zoning to create buffers between the neighborhoods in which they resided and those in which
perceived outsiders were permitted to live.55
The Village of Euclid, Ohio was one such enclave that rapidly developed during the post-World War I era. Euclid, now a city, is located
immediately to the east of Cleveland along the shores of Lake Erie.
Though a majority of its population is African American today, just
1.3% of its population was African Americans in the 1920 Census.56
Meanwhile, between 1910 and 1920, the size of Cleveland’s African
American population had more than quadrupled from 8,448 to
34,451.57 Its adoption of a zoning ordinance in 1922 initiated a sequence of events that led to the Supreme Court giving its imprimatur
to zoning. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
applied a permissive rational basis standard in upholding Euclid’s zon48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 82.
FREUND, supra note 39, at 59.
Id.
JACKSON, supra note 42, at 241-42.
FREUND, supra note 39, at 70-72 (describing proliferation of zoning ordinances in Michigan).
ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS 8-15 (2010).
FREUND, supra note 39, at 14-15.
Id. at 54-61.
U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1920, Ohio, Composition and Characteristics
of the Population for Places of 2,500 to 10,000 (1922).
U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1920, Ohio, Age, for Cities of 10,000 or More
(1922); U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1910, Ohio, Age, for Cities of 25,000 or
More (1913).
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ing ordinance in the face of a challenge to its validity under the Due
Process Clause.58
Sometimes forgotten in light of the Court’s decisive opinion in Euclid is the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, which the Court overturned.59 In a decision holding that Euclid’s zoning ordinance violated the Due Process Clause, Judge Westenhaven saw past the facts of the instant case, which involved a
property owner that wished to use its land for industrial purposes, to
write that “the result to be accomplished is to classify the population
and segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”60
The only reason why one household might live in a mansion, another
in a duplex, and a third in an apartment, Judge Westenhaven concluded, was socioeconomic status.61 Thus, economic exclusion and, by
extension, racial exclusion, were at the heart of zoning from its inception. And, though Judge Westenhaven’s opinion reflected the prevailing white supremacism of his times in suggesting that the Louisville
ordinance struck down in Buchanan might have been more justifiable
than Euclid’s ordinance,62 it was clear at the time that economic exclusion meant racial and ethnic exclusion, as well.63
b. Exclusionary Zoning and the Fair Housing Act
A new status quo emerged out of Buchanan and Euclid, which, despite some contrary currents, remains in place today. Explicit racial
zoning, like that of Louisville in Buchanan, was not permissible, but
race-neutral zoning that separated people on the basis of housing
density and often restricted density altogether was acceptable.64 The
predictable effect, and often the intent, of the latter form of zoning,
has been intense residential racial segregation. Among the many reasons for this causal relationship have been explicitly racially discriminatory federal mortgage lending policies that pushed middle-class and
affluent African Americans into the rental housing market and the
broader longstanding correlation between race and socioeconomic
status in the United States.65 With the revival of the Equal Protection
Clause in the decades following Euclid and the passage of the Fair
58. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 277 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
59. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (N.D. Ohio 1924),
overruled by Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
60. Id. at 309, 316-17.
61. Id. at 316.
62. Id. at 312-13.
63. See Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
597, 606-08 (2001) (discussing the race relations context of Euclid); Joel
Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zoning,
43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 60-61 (1993) (tracing the race-based origins of
facially neutral land use controls).
64. Kosman, supra note 62, at 75, 79.
65. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 39, 99-175 (discussing the history of discriminatory mortgage lending policies and practices).
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Housing Act (FHA) in 1968, new lines of attack in the struggle for
inclusive land use policies emerged.66
In the 1970s, three major cases illuminated the contours of fair
housing and civil rights advocates’ ability to challenge exclusionary
zoning ordinances and reinforced the nexus between traditional,
often called Euclidean, zoning and segregation. In United States v. City
of Black Jack, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the zoning ordinance of a developing suburb of St. Louis, Missouri
violated the FHA because of its unjustified discriminatory effect.67 Although the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice litigated the case in the Eighth Circuit, the case arose out of failed
attempts by an affordable housing developer with the mission of promoting residential integration to build in Black Jack.68 The City both
incorporated and adopted its zoning ordinance, in substantial part,
with the purpose of derailing that development proposal.69 The case
was the first in which a court applied the disparate impact or discriminatory effects test in deciding a case under the FHA.70 City of Black Jack
armed advocates with a powerful tool for combatting exclusionary
zoning.71
The Supreme Court followed City of Black Jack by mitigating its utility in Warth v. Seldin, a case that hinged on the issue of standing in
exclusionary zoning cases.72 In Warth, a variety of plaintiffs challenged
the validity of the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York, an affluent
suburb of Rochester.73 They alleged that the ordinance unconstitutionally excluded low-income people but did not include a claim of
race discrimination in violation of the FHA.74 Unlike in City of Black
Jack, there was no developer prepared to build affordable housing in
the event of an increase in the allowable density.75 Thus, in assessing
whether the individual plaintiffs who wished to move to Penfield
could demonstrate injury-in-fact, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that, “absent the respondents’ restrictive
zoning practices, there [was] a substantial probability that they would
have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield.”76 That holding was
significant and has informed many lower court decisions on standing
66. See James J. Hartnett, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American
Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 89, 111-14 (1993) (discussing the use of the Fair Housing Act to challenge exclusionary zoning).
67. U.S. v. City of Black Jack, MO, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974).
68. Id. at 1182.
69. Id. at 1182-83.
70. Id. at 1184-85, 1188.
71. See id.
72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975).
73. Id. at 490.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 504.
76. Id.
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in FHA cases because, unlike the Warth Court’s decision with respect
to the standing of white residents of Penfield who desired to live in a
more diverse community, the plaintiffs who wished to move to
Penfield failed to demonstrate Article III standing and not just prudential standing.77
Lastly, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (Arlington Heights I), the Supreme Court clarified that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the Equal Protection
Clause and articulated a test for inferring discriminatory intent from
circumstantial evidence.78 The underlying case involved a municipality’s refusal to rezone land to allow a nonprofit affordable housing
developer to build townhomes for low and moderate-income households in a predominantly white suburb to the northwest of Chicago.79
In light of the demographics of the region, building the housing
would have had the effect of fostering residential racial integration.80
The Court decided the case shortly after issuing its decision in Washington v. Davis, which had already held that discriminatory intent was
necessary to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but
which was decided after the Seventh Circuit decision that the Court
reversed in Arlington Heights I.81 The Court’s test for inferring discriminatory intent has become the touchstone of disparate treatment analysis in exclusionary zoning cases under the FHA.82
It is important to note that the Court remanded the case to the
Seventh Circuit for further proceedings on the question of whether
Arlington Heights’ refusal to rezone the property in question violated
the FHA in light of its disparate impact.83 In Arlington Heights II, the
Seventh Circuit held that it did, building upon the foundation laid by
the Eighth Circuit in City of Black Jack.84 Thus, by the late 1970s, it was
clear the FHA had the potential to serve as a tool for remedying exclusionary zoning, but the constraints of standing doctrine and the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence
somewhat curtailed the effectiveness of that tool.
c. Exclusionary Zoning and Due Process
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Euclid gave municipalities a wide berth to adopt restrictive zoning and land use policies, that
case did not put the theory that exclusionary zoning raises serious due
77. Id. at 517-18.
78. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-69
(1977).
79. Id. at 255.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 269-70.
82. Id. at 266-68.
83. Id. at 272.
84. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II),
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
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process concerns to rest for two reasons.85 First, although the rational
basis test articulated by the Court in Euclid was deferential, the Court
did not foreclose the possibility that some extreme policies might be
discarded as arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable.86 In fact, in Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, decided just two years after Euclid, the Supreme
Court held that the city’s decision to zone the plaintiff’s property,
which was alleged to be better suited to industrial or commercial purposes in light of adjoining uses, as residential violated the Due Process
Clause.87 Although there has been a notable lack of federal due process cases building on Nectow,88 the case still stands for the proposition
that rational basis review in land use cases need not be entirely
toothless.
While there are far more certain avenues for challenging exclusionary zoning than federal due process claims, the Supreme Court’s
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence with respect to disability status
and sexual orientation over the last three decades suggests one potential path forward.89 There is a colorable argument that discriminatory
animus against low-income people motivates zoning restrictions on
multi-family housing, mobile homes, and other types of housing that
are likely to be affordable to low-income households. Although socioeconomic status is not a protected class under the Equal Protection
Clause,90 a desire to harm people because of their socioeconomic status by depriving them of access to housing may not have a rational
basis.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928).
Despite its arguably progressive outcome, Nectow, in its application of Substantive Due Process, was very much a product of a product of the conservative Lochner era. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that
New York’s law establishing the maximum number of hours that bakers
could work violated the Due Process Clause). The Supreme Court’s shift
away from the robust application of the Due Process Clause beginning in
1937 might have dissuaded litigants from brining Substantive Due Process
challenges to land use restrictions. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that Washington state’s minimum wage law for
women did not violate the Due Process Clause).
89. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that discriminatory animus was not a rational foundation for a policy prohibiting state or
local government entities from adopting anti-discrimination protections for
sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
446-47 (1985) (holding that “a bare. . .desire to harm a politically unpopular group” could not be a rational basis for a zoning ordinance limiting the
location of group homes for persons with intellectual disabilities) (quoting
U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
90. See San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1973)
(holding that Texas’s system of school financing did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause because poor people did not
comprise a protected class and there was no fundamental right to
education).
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From the racial justice standpoint of promoting integration, it is
important to bear in mind what the Due Process Clause might bring
to the table that the FHA would not. Principally, the FHA is unlikely
to provide significant leverage in homogeneous regions that are heavily white. The demographics of those regions, however, are not set in
stone, and development patterns that unfold while those areas are not
diverse are likely to affect levels of segregation as they diversify. Such
change can occur quite rapidly.
Second, and with more power, state constitutions generally have
their own due process clauses, which state courts can interpret as providing stronger protections than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most notably, in Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that, under that state’s constitution, municipalities must use their
zoning authority to allow for the development of their fair share of
the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing.91 The court
referenced both due process and equal protection principles in explaining the rationale for its decision, but the decision’s focus on the
inconsistency of Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance with the general
welfare is more consistent with due process analysis.92 Mount Laurel
and its progeny led New Jersey’s legislature to adopt a statutory
scheme for state regulation of local zoning that is discussed in detail
in Section III of this article.93
A few other states, while not embracing as active of a judicial role as
in New Jersey, have some level of meaningful judicial review of exclusionary zoning policies that appears to go beyond that provided for by
the Supreme Court in Euclid. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that municipalities must consider the welfare of individuals who
live outside of their boundaries in exercising their zoning powers in
order to comply with the state’s zoning enabling act and that, as a
result, restrictive zoning may be impermissible.94 The court did not
reach the constitutional issue in that case, but its interpretation of the
enabling statute was consistent with due process principles.95 In contrast to New Jersey, the court narrowly circumscribed developers’ access to a builder’s remedy for exclusionary zoning, leaving the burden
of proving that a proposed use is reasonable on the developer.96 In
Willistown Township v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that municipalities must “provide for a fair share
of. . .acreage for apartment construction.”97 This is arguably a substan91. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174
(1975).
92. Id. at 174-75.
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-329.9 (1985).
94. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 440-41 (1991).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 443-44.
97. Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975).
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tially lower bar for a municipality to clear than that of Mount Laurel or
Britton as the inquiry is focused on the reasonableness of the percentage of a municipality’s land to be zoned for multi-family housing
rather than the relationship between the amount of land and regional
need for affordable housing.98 In Berenson v. New Castle, the New York
Court of Appeals adopted what, in practice, has turned out to be a
similar approach.99 Although the rhetoric of that court’s decision focused on whether municipalities have considered the regional need
for affordable housing,100 subsequent decisions applying the decision
have not been successful in the absence of near total bans on multifamily housing.101 Although due process challenges to exclusionary
zoning fact an uphill struggle, targeted attempts to build upon this
area of the law under state constitutional provisions may expand the
fair housing advocacy toolkit.
d. Exclusionary Zoning Today
Although FHA litigation has proven successful in reducing some
barriers to the development of affordable housing in targeted communities, the strategy generally has not had a systemic effect. Observers can find proof of that contention in the fact that exclusionary
zoning is still relatively widespread and in the persistence of litigation
to this day. If the major exclusionary zoning lawsuits of the 1970s
would have had their intended effect, local governments that were not
defendants in those actions would be deterred from engaging in similar practices. Three important trends in contemporary efforts to eradicate exclusionary zoning through FHA litigation are worthy of note.
First, as an empirical matter, restrictive residential zoning is still
quite common, particularly in metropolitan areas that are highly segregated by race. For example, in Westchester County, of the 31
predominantly white municipalities targeted for the development of
affordable housing development under the consent decree in U.S. ex
rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County,
26 towns and villages allow multi-family housing development as-ofright on less than 10% of all residentially zoned land.102 Eight of those
towns and villages allow such development as-of-right on less than 1%
of residentially zoned land.103 Additionally, according to the Fair
Housing Center of Greater Boston, 43% of municipalities in Greater
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.; See supra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text.
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 242.
See Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 511 N.E.2d 67, 70 (N.Y. 1987);
Suffolk Interreligious Coal. on Hous. v. Town of Brookhaven, 575 N.Y.S.2d 548,
549-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
102. Monitor’s Final Report on Westchester County’s Analysis of Municipal Zoning, Exhibit 2, U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 06-CV-2860 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013).
103. Id.
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Boston allow multi-family housing on less than 10% of their land, and
about 10% of municipalities either ban multi-family housing altogether or only allow multi-family housing for seniors, which is less
likely to be occupied by people of color than family-occupancy housing.104 Similar patterns are replicated throughout the country, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest.
The second is that advocates continue to litigate lawsuits similarly to
City of Black Jack and Arlington Heights II.105 There has not been a huge
volume of these cases, and, for every successful challenge, there has
been at least one that faltered in light of the standing requirements of
Warth, an inability to marshal adequate statistical evidence, or the
strength of the municipality’s justification for its zoning policies.106
Even when plaintiffs have succeeded, the relief that courts have been
willing to grant has sometimes been meager, and the amount of time
that it has taken to achieve some of those victories has been immense.107 Despite those difficulties, the Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding the disparate impact standard in Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project has the
potential to breathe new life into exclusionary zoning litigation as Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion identified exclusionary zoning cases
as comprising the heartland of the FHA.108 Overall, traditional exclusionary zoning lawsuits under the FHA are still a viable tool for combatting exclusionary zoning; however, they have proven more
successful at securing individualized relief on a case-by-case basis than
they have at providing a general deterrent effect.
The third is U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York,
Inc. v. Westchester County (Westchester), the recent landmark case construing the duty to AFFH that played a major a role in motivating
104. 1970s-Present: Restriction of Multi-Family Zoning, THE FAIR HOUSING CENTER
OF GREATER BOSTON, http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1970spresent-Local-Land_use-Regulations-2.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
105. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt. Inc. v. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that a decision to rezone a property to allow
townhomes but not apartments violated the FHA); Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009)
(holding that a moratorium on multi-family development violated the
FHA); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(holding that a municipality’s one-acre minimum lot size requirement for
residential development violated the FHA).
106. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 65
AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013). In particular, identifying plaintiffs with standing
to challenge exclusionary zoning has been difficult. Affordable housing developers are often best positioned to prove that they have suffered injury as
a result of land use barriers, but they may be unwilling to file lawsuits because they tend to be repeat players who are dependent upon municipal
goodwill in order to function.
107. Id.
108. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2511 (2015).
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HUD to develop its new regulation.109 Although the plaintiff in Westchester brought its action under the False Claims Act based on the failure to properly engage in required planning activities rather the FHA,
the issue of exclusionary zoning has dominated discussions about the
implementation of the settlement.110 Pursuant to a consent decree,
the county was required to produce a new Analysis of Impediments
(AI), the planning document that preceded the AFH, to Fair Housing
Choice, among other requirements.111 The county still has not prepared an AI that HUD has found acceptable because the county has
failed to identify exclusionary zoning in any of its villages and
towns.112 As a result, HUD has reallocated tens of millions of dollars
in federal grant funds from the county to other jurisdictions.113 Although HUD has not taken a similarly hard line against other jurisdictions by requiring them to identify and take action against
exclusionary zoning in order to receive federal funds, the systemic
dimensions of that type of approach are clear.114 Where case-by-case
FHA litigation has proven inadequate to the task of eradicating exclusionary zoning, tying the receipt of federal funds to action to dismantle such segregative policies, including on the part of lesser units of
local government, could lead to progress.
III. Successfully Promoting Residential Racial Integration through
State Land Use Reform
As the litigation discussed in Section II of this article makes clear,
most attempts to remediate exclusionary zoning have taken place at
the local level; however, as the discussion of the role and powers of
states in Section I makes clear, state governments have the ability and
the obligation to take action to eradicate exclusionary zoning that perpetuates residential racial segregation, as well. The Westchester case, although involving a local government, illustrates how a larger unit of
government may be responsible for the policies and practices of its
109. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
110. Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 06-CV-2860 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2009).
111. Id.
112. Westchester Cnty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 778 F.3d 412 (2d. Cir.
2015).
113. Id.; But see Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo,
Congresswoman Lowey Announce Plan to Make $5 Million Federal Community Development Investments Available to Westchester County Communities (Feb. 9, 2015) (on file with author), available at https://www.gov
ernor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-congresswoman-lowey-announce-planmake-5-million-federal-community-development (announcing the State of
New York’s plan to provide CDBG, HOME, and ESG funds available to
communities in Westchester County).
114. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 668 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
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sub-parts.115 A handful of states have taken the initiative to develop
and implement reforms to their land use regulation regimes that have
the effect of reducing exclusionary zoning. This section addresses how
three of those models operate when viewed through a race-conscious
prism.
a. New Jersey
The New Jersey Fair Housing Act116 is in some ways the gold standard for state law innovations that mitigate exclusionary zoning in a
manner that is well calibrated to achieve AFFH goals. At the same
time, that system was the result of and continues to be fraught with
litigation.117 That conflict is both a reflection of its effectiveness,
which has riled exclusionary suburbs, and its complexity, which has
even baffled supporters at times.118 Regardless, it is well worth the effort to try to understand how the law has worked in the past and is
intended to work.
Under the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, an administrative agency,
the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), is responsible for determining each municipality’s fair share of the regional need for housing
that is affordable to moderate-income, low-income, and very low-income households.119 Under the statute, moderate-income households
are defined as those earning between 50% and 80% of the area median income (AMI), low-income households are those making between 30% and 50% of AMI, and very low-income households are
those making less than 30% of AMI.120 Once COAH establishes the
size of those allocations of units, individual municipalities that seek to
avoid builder’s remedy lawsuits are responsible for developing plans
that provide a reasonable opportunity for the development of housing
to meet those needs.121 When the process has worked effectively, compliant jurisdictions have generally met their obligations through the
use of mandatory inclusionary zoning and through rezoning develop115. Id. at 548.
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-329.9 (1985).
117. See, e.g., In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable
Hous., 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015); South Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II); South Burlington
Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Mount
Laurel I).
118. For instance, in 2011, the New Jersey Legislature adopted a bill substantially
simplifying the provisions of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act and had the
support of fair housing advocates in doing so. Governor Chris Christie vetoed the bill. See Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Rejects N.J. Bill’s Affordable
Housing Minimum Requirement, NJ.COM (Jan. 25, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/gov_christie_rejects_nj_afford.html.
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307.
120. Id. § 52:27D-304.
121. Id. § 52:27D-309.
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able land in order to accommodate higher density.122 When municipalities do not adopt effective plans, advocates are able to bring
judicial challenges to those inadequate plans,123 and developers may
bring so-called “builder’s remedy” suits in order to allow them to construct housing that includes an affordable component.124
A few things stand out about the New Jersey Fair Housing Act from
a fair housing perspective that make the law a model for other states
to follow. First, the law focuses on units that are affordable to households earning below 30% of AMI and between 30% and 50% of AMI
in addition to those making between 50% and 80% of AMI.125 Some
other states focus exclusively on the production of units at between
50% and 80% of AMI, as do many jurisdictions with mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances nationwide.
In most metropolitan areas, the correlation between race and
ethnicity, on the one hand, and socioeconomic status, on the other, is
likely to be much more pronounced below 50% of AMI than it is
above that threshold.126 Second, assessing housing need regionally
better accords with the obligation to overcome, rather than simply
mitigate, residential segregation.127 By contrast, Massachusetts and
Connecticut effectively set each municipality’s obligation at 10% of
the municipality’s own housing stock, which is far below what any municipality’s fair share is likely to be. Third, a planning process informed by robust community engagement can empower historically

122. Id. § 52:27D-311.
123. See In re Twp. of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993) (with the Public Advocate
representing three public interest entities).
124. See Mount Olive Complex v. Twp. of Mount Olive, 774 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-303.
126. See MARGARET C. SIMMS ET AL., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AMONG LOWINCOME FAMILIES 11 (2009). Data that demonstrates the correlation between race and ethnicity and extremely low-income or very low-income status is limited because of limitations in Census data; however, according to a
2009 Urban Institute study, 53% of African American families and 45% of
Latino families with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level had
incomes that were below 100% of the federal poverty level. By contrast, just
39% of white families with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty line
had incomes below 100% of the federal poverty line. It is important to note
that, aside from Alaska and Hawaii, there is geographic variation in the
federal poverty line so it is not a proxy for AMI. Nonetheless, the data is
illustrative of the broader point that there are demographic variations
among income segments of the low-income population which tend to reflect greater disadvantage on the part of African American and Latino individuals and families.
127. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, FEDERAL REGISTER (Jul., 2015), available
at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/07/16/2015-17032/af
firmatively-furthering-fair-housing.
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marginalized communities, avoid the selection of low quality sites for
rezoning, and build long-term political support for the statute.128
The main drawbacks to the New Jersey approach are its complexity
and the extent to which it has provoked political opposition. Although
political challenges can be surmountable, they stymied the effectiveness of that state’s law for several years. COAH has failed to adopt
valid rules for determining fair share allocations because of Governor
Chris Christie’s opposition to the underlying statute.129 In the face of
that intransigence, the New Jersey Supreme Court retook judicial control of the process in 2015, basing obligations on the methodology
used for prior rounds of the fair share allocation process.130 The
court’s action was an important victory for fair housing advocates but
also casts some doubt on the durability of administrative agencies as
vehicles for implementing reforms to land use regulation with respect
to affordable housing.131 As an additional note, the complexity of determining fair share allocations has, at times, led to some conflict with
environmental conservation advocates in addition to the more predictable run-ins with suburban local governments.132 This occasional
source of tension demonstrates the need to adopt a nuanced approach to greenfield development that neither encourages sprawl nor
exempts exurban communities from providing opportunities for affordable housing development.
Empirical evidence about zoning and housing production under
the New Jersey Fair Housing Act suggests that the existing framework
is doing some good, but that greater enforcement of the statute’s re128. JOHN POWELL ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSURING ROBUST CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & EQUITY IN DETROIT’S SHRINKING CITY PLANNING EFFORT 2, available at http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2010/12_2010_Equity
Engagement_ShrinkingCities.pdf.
129. See Brent Johnson, N.J. Supreme Court Rebukes Christie Administration, Puts
Courts in Charge of Affordable Housing, NJ.COM (Mar. 11, 2015, 12:03 AM),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/03/nj_supreme_court_re
bukes_christie_administration_puts_courts_in_charge_of_affordable_hous
ing.html; Salvador Rizzo, N.J. Supreme Court Blocks Christie’s Plan to Abolish
Affordable-Housing Agency, NJ.COM (July 10, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://
www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/07/nj_supreme_court_blocks_chris
ties_plan_to_abolish_affordable-housing_agency.html; Megan DeMarco,
Gov. Christie Abolishes N.J. council on Affordable Housing, NJ.COM (June 29,
2011, 9:31 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/gov_christie
_abolishes_nj_coun.html.
130. In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 110 A.3d 31,
48-49 (N.J. 2015).
131. See Colleen O’Dea, COAH is History: State’s Top Court Declares Troubled Agency
“Moribund”, NJSPOTLIGHT.COM (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com
/stories/15/03/11/coah-is-history-supreme-court-declares-troubled-stateagency-moribund/.
132. See MaryAnn Spoto, N.J. Appellate Court Upholds Highlands Council Plan to Prevent Housing Development in Environmentally-Sensitive Area, NJ.COM (Aug. 16,
2011, 5:50 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/08/court_up
holds_highlands_counci.html.
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quirements is needed in order to truly overcome the effects of exclusionary zoning.133 Between 1980 and 2012, New Jersey produced
52,160 affordable units as a direct result of the Mount Laurel I decision
and the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, which was enacted in 1985.134
This total was higher than the total number of affordable housing
units produced through any of the other models discussed in this article for which data is available.135 In a 2011 study, a research team from
Rowan University found that the proportion of low-density residential
development had actually increased, while the proportion of highdensity residential development had decreased after the enactment of
the New Jersey Fair Housing Act.136 However, that study suggested
that, but for the law, the imbalance in favor of low-density development would have been even more pronounced.137 Indeed, as over
80% of municipalities with fair share obligations under the act have
not seen the development of sufficient affordable housing to meet
their obligations,138 it does not appear that low standards have contributed to prevailing patterns of low-density development. Rather, a
significant amount of high-density development has occurred within
areas that were slated for such development because of planning initiated in response to statutory obligations.139 Although the New Jersey
model is better attuned to fair housing goals than any other, a combination of stronger enforcement, more ambitious goals, and a nuanced
approach to growth management at the periphery of metropolitan areas might result in a more effective regulatory system for mitigating
exclusionary zoning.140 Lastly, and this is true of all regimes, New
Jersey’s system remains reliant on the willingness and ability of private
developers to build housing including an affordable component as
there is no affirmative obligation on the part of municipalities to subsidize development.
133. In re N.J.A.C., 110 A.3d at 48-49.
134. RACHEL G. BRATT, OVERCOMING RESTRICTIVE ZONING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN FIVE STATES: OBSERVATIONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS 159 (Feb. 10, 2012).
135. Id.
136. JOHN HASSE ET AL., EVIDENCE OF PERSISTENT EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF
LAND USE POLICY WITHIN HISTORIC AND PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS
IN NEW JERSEY: A CASE STUDY OF MONMOUTH AND SOMERSET COUNTIES 22
(2011).
137. Id. at 24.
138. BRATT, supra note 133, at 126.
139. HASSE ET AL., supra note 135, at 23.
140. A significant portion of low-density single family residential development in
New Jersey took place outside of so-called Smart Growth Areas. Id. at 22.
These areas generally have not been targeted for high fair share allocations
because of a variety of factors including distance from job centers, lack of
supportive services, and environmental concerns. However, zoning barriers
in these locations, while high enough to deter affordable housing development, have been too low to dissuade developers from building luxury housing. In order to effectively co-locate new market rate development and new
affordable housing, either stricter limits on growth in rural or exurban areas or a higher fair share allocations for such areas may be necessary.
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b. California
California’s Housing Element is a required component of each municipality’s General Plan.141 Thus, as in New Jersey, there are opportunities for community engagement in the process of developing the
document. Municipalities are required to identify sites and sufficiently
zone properties to absorb each community’s allocation of the future
need for housing for very low-income (between 30% and 50% of
AMI), low-income (between 50% and 80% of AMI), moderate-income
(between 80% and 120% of AMI), and above moderate-income
(greater than 120% of AMI) households.142 Unlike New Jersey, California does not include allocations of regional housing need for
households earning less than 30% of AMI although planning efforts
must address those needs in a vaguer manner.143 The comparative
failure of California’s Housing Element requirement to address the
needs of households below 30% of AMI makes the model less valuable
than that of New Jersey from a fair housing perspective.144
Like New Jersey, the authority to determine regional housing need
is vested in an administrative agency, the California Department of
Housing and Community Development.145 California’s system is made
more complicated because the sub-allocation of the need to individual municipalities within regions is conducted by the various councils
of governments.146 Thus, for a municipality in Los Angeles County,
the state agency would determine the regional housing need for
Southern California, and then the Southern California Association of
Governments would determine that city or town’s share of the regional need. This added layer of administrative governance has positive and negative features. It increases the risk of methodological
inconsistency in determining municipalities’ allocations of regional
housing need, but it also has the potential to increase local buy-in to
the system by fostering both the perception and the reality of responsiveness to context-specific concerns.
With respect to enforcement, advocacy organizations can challenge
the validity of municipalities’ housing elements in state court, and attorney’s fees are available to prevailing plaintiffs in those suits. Like in
New Jersey, affordable housing developers have a builder’s remedy;
however, that remedy is only available if at least 49% of its units are
141. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65580 (2000).
142. Id. § 65583(c)(1)(A); but see Brian Augusta, Building Housing from the Ground
Up: Strengthening California Law to Ensure Adequate Locations for Affordable
Housing, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 503, 540-41 (1999) (arguing for reforms to
the Housing Element law that would require greater specificity in the identification of sites).
143. See GOV’T § 65583(a)(1) (2000) (requiring jurisdictions to analyze extremely low-income housing needs).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 65584.01.
146. Id. § 65584.03.
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affordable to very low-, low-, and moderate-income households.147 California, accordingly, has a somewhat weaker mandate than New Jersey
though the availability of attorney’s fees has proven to be a sufficient
incentive to ensure that there is at least some enforcement activity by
advocates.148 In highly populated metropolitan areas that have a solid
base of advocacy organizations and community stakeholders that are
able to participate in the development of jurisdictional Housing Elements, this enforcement structure is largely adequate. In exurban and
rural areas, its weaknesses are more glaring. A court order to redo a
Housing Element is only worth so much if no stakeholder groups have
the capacity to influence the revision process. Meanwhile, it may be
profitable for a developer to construct mixed-income multi-family
housing in outlying communities if allowed to do so at a higher density than permitted by existing zoning. The absence of a mechanism
for administrative enforcement of California’s Housing Element law
may be seen as a shortcoming,149
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine how many units of
affordable housing California has produced as a result of the Housing
Element requirement because of a lack of adequate data.150 Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that new housing in jurisdictions with
compliant Housing Elements is more likely to be multi-family housing
than in communities that are out of compliance, and there is some
support for the contention that the Housing Element requirement
has increased housing production overall.151 It also appears that the
proportion of California jurisdictions with compliant Housing Elements is higher than the proportion of New Jersey municipalities that
met their prior round fair share obligations though it is important to
note that a compliant Housing Element is far from a guarantee that
low- and moderate-income housing production will meet a California
jurisdiction’s share of regional housing need.152 The absence of data
on the portion of that housing that is affordable highlights the need
to incorporate strong recordkeeping and reporting requirements into
any statutory regime. Lastly, it is important to note that, for parts of
the period in which the Housing Element has been in effect, California has had other laws, such as the California Coastal Act,153 and prevailing state court decisions, such as those limiting the applicability of

147. Id. §§ 65583(g), 65589.5(d).
148. Id. § 65589.5(k).
149. See Ben Field, Why Our Fair Share Laws Fail, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35, 78
(1993) (arguing that litigation had proven to be a “poor enforcement tool”
and that administrative enforcement would be more effective).
150. BRATT, supra note 133, at 143-45.
151. Id. at 136.
152. Id. at 138.
153. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30600(a), 30106 (2016)
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inclusionary zoning,154 that make the development of affordable
housing more difficult under some circumstances. Mandatory inclusionary zoning is an especially important tool for ensuring affordability when a statutory regime presupposes that density is a proxy
for affordability.
c. Massachusetts and Connecticut
In comparison to New Jersey and California, the Massachusetts155
and Connecticut156 models deemphasize the planning process and
empower multi-family housing developers. In each state, municipalities in which less than 10% of the housing stock is affordable to households at 80% of AMI are subject to a builder’s remedy.157 Developers
in Massachusetts proposing mixed-income housing under such circumstances face a simplified, streamlined application process in trying
to secure zoning approval and permits.158 In both states, if the developer’s application is denied, they have the ability to appeal the denial
and have their appeal adjudicated under a more favorable standard
than would be applicable under nearly all states’ land use laws.159 In
Massachusetts, an administrative agency hears that appeal whereas the
state courts hear appeals in Connecticut.160 In Massachusetts, the administrative agency’s determination is ultimately appealable to superior court.161 With respect to enforcement, advocates and community
members who are not developers do not have the ability to challenge
the conduct of municipalities under these laws. Unfortunately, the
Massachusetts law does not distinguish between family-occupancy,
which is more likely to promote integration, and senior housing in
determining eligibility for the builder’s remedy.162 By contrast, although Connecticut does allow municipalities that are seeking to
show that they have met the 10% threshold to count elderly units, the
statute wisely weights family-occupancy units more heavily than elderly
units.163
154. See Palmer/Sixth St. Properties, L.P. v. City of L.A., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1396,
1410-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the application of mandatory
inclusionary zoning to rental properties constituted rent control in violation of the Costa-Hawkins Act).
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2003).
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2013).
157. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(k).
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21; Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies
to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
877, 892 (2006).
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 22; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(f).
160. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 23; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(f).
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 22.
162. See Orfield, supra note 157, at 892-93 (contending that there is little evidence that the Massachusetts law promotes integration because of its failure to distinguish between family-occupancy and elderly units).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(l)(6).
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Although Massachusetts and Connecticut deemphasize the planning process, Massachusetts holds out the possibility of avoiding a
stringent builder’s remedy if municipalities engage in effective planning.164 Those options, however, are in not nearly as widespread use
as equivalent housing plans in New Jersey and California, and the portions of the respective states that remain subject to a builder’s remedy
are significant. Since Housing Production Plans in Massachusetts must
address the needs of very low-income households, any strengthening
of the planning components of these statutes is likely to have positive
fair housing ramifications.165
By confining the scope of municipalities’ legal obligation to housing that is affordable at 80% of AMI and creating structures that
downplay the role of community-based stakeholders and advocates,
these laws have clear shortcomings.166 Additionally, as noted above, it
is highly unlikely that a jurisdiction’s fair share of affordable housing
need would ever comprise just 10% of its own housing stock. Thus,
there are real limitations on the potential of these tools to foster significant levels of residential racial and ethnic integration.
The Massachusetts and Connecticut models do have their strengths,
however. Namely, they are comparatively much easier to administer
and do not require nearly as much expertise as do New Jersey and
California.167 Developers find the streamlined permitting and appeals
process to be helpful to their activities, which translates into hard
units on the ground.168 Connecticut also requires developers seeking
to use the builder’s remedy to engage in affirmative fair housing marketing, which should be mandatory under any type of regulatory regime.169 Nonetheless, those positive features, while serving a
legitimate public purpose by increasing the supply of housing for
households earning 80% of AMI, are not well calibrated to serving the
goals of the FHA. Additionally, the Massachusetts and Connecticut
laws – despite their less ambitious scope – have been subject to the
constant threat of repeal or dilution.170
164.
165.
166.
167.

760 MASS. CODE REGS. § 56.03(4).
Id. § 56.02.
Id.
But see Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One
Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535, 57779 (1993) (recommending strategies for addressing delays in the Massachusetts administrative appeals process).
168. Id. at 555.
169. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 8-30g-7(a)(1)(E) (2016).
170. See, e.g., Kathleen Burge, Critics Push for Repeal of 40B, THE BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct. 17, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/arti
cles/2010/10/17/critics__push_for_repeal__of_40b; Mary E. O’Leary, Connecticut Lawmakers Fight Affordable Housing Regulations, THE NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2015, 11:19 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/
20150205/connecticut-lawmakers-fight-affordable-housing-regulations.
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Neither Massachusetts nor Connecticut has been as successful in
producing affordable units through their regimes as New Jersey. Between 1969 and 2012, Massachusetts’s law resulted in the production
of 30,703 units of affordable housing.171 Between 1990 and 2015, developers in Connecticut produced approximately 7,500 units as a result of that state’s law.172 According to an analysis by Professor Rachel
Bratt of Tufts University, adjusted for population size, Massachusetts
produced 48 units of affordable housing per 10,000 residents while
New Jersey produced 62 units of affordable housing per 10,000 residents.173 Applying the same methodology to Connecticut, that state
has produced 22 units per 10,000 residents. It is important to keep in
mind that the Massachusetts program has been in place for the longest duration while the Connecticut program has been in place for the
shortest amount of time.174 Nonetheless, that consideration does not
change the fact that New Jersey has been the most productive state on
a per year basis while Connecticut has been the least productive.175
From a fair housing perspective, the Massachusetts model has notably
resulted in production through its law occurring in municipalities
with high median incomes and predominantly white populations in
comparison to communities that have significant amounts of affordable housing that was produced through other programs.176
d. Extracting a model
In attempting to extract a model for other states from New Jersey,
California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, a handful of features are
salient. An effective state land use regulatory regime should: (1) empower local governments, advocacy organizations, and communitybased stakeholders to engage in a collaborative planning process that
increases acceptance of municipalities’ obligations and avoids the risk
of adverse site selection for rezoning and/or subsidized development;
(2) ensure that both planning activities and enforcement activities address the needs of households earning less than 50% of AMI; (3) require affirmative fair housing marketing in connection with the units
produced under the relevant obligation; (4) provide for private enforcement by both multi-family developers and advocacy organizations; and (5) strong recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
These features are grounded in lessons learned both from the states
that have had these laws and from decades of fair housing advocacy
more generally. To some extent, they are also based on common
sense.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

BRATT, supra note 133, at 159.
See O’Leary, supra note 169.
BRATT, supra note 133, at 159.
Id.
Id.; O’Leary, supra note 169.
BRATT, supra note 133, at 159.
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1. A Planning Mandate Emphasizing Site Selection and Municipal
Buy-In
The implementation of the consent decree in Westchester has been
replete with controversy, but, unlike in many efforts to remediate exclusionary suburban policies, that controversy has tended not to involve site selection.177 Chappaqua Station, a proposed 28-unit
development in the Town of New Castle that would be located on a
sliver of land between train tracks and a highway onramp, is the exception to that rule.178 Chappaqua Station has faced significant community opposition from individuals based on the poor choice of site,
regardless of whether or not they oppose any affordable housing development in their neighborhood.179 It has also drawn criticism from
the Anti-Discrimination Center, the civil rights organization that originally brought the Westchester suit.180 Some of the other development
sites that Westchester County is using to fulfill its obligation under the
consent decree suffer from similar defects, whether they are geographically isolated, subject to adverse environmental features, and/
or on the border of communities with much more diverse
populations.
These types of sites may be appealing to developers because they
are comparatively inexpensive or are properly zoned for multi-family
housing. Their potential to promote meaningful racial or ethnic integration, however, is less than that of developments that are better incorporated into the fabric of communities. They may also raise health
or safety risks for their residents. When both exclusionary community
opponents and civil rights advocates are in agreement about a site,
there may be a real problem, even if there are grounds to doubt the
good faith of one side.
Concentrating affordable housing development efforts in high opportunity areas on sites that do not have obvious flaws also has the
potential to play an important role in exposing the motivations of area
residents who continue to oppose development. When the legitimate
reasons for opposing a particular development disappear, only pretext
or irrationality remains. In the context of legal challenges to exclusionary zoning, the inability of a municipality to show a convincing
reason for its decision to block a proposal is hugely valuable for
advocates.
177. Monitor Identifies Westchester Violation of Consent Decree, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
CENTER (May 11, 2015), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/article/monitor-iden
tifies-westchester-violation-consent-decree.
178. Id.
179. David M. Wilson, Chappaqua Station Affordable Units Back on Track, THE JOURNAL NEWS (July 3, 2015, 2:37 PM), http://www.lohud.com/story/money/
personal-finance/taxes/david-mckay-wilson/2015/07/03/chappaqua-af
fordable-housing-track/29667647/ (describing how town board member
has not done anything to make alternative site viable for housing).
180. Monitor Identifies Westchester Violation of Consent Decrees, supra note 176.
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Taking a planning-based approach to reducing exclusionary barriers is important from a fair housing perspective because doing so
reduces the risk of site selection that does not contribute to integration and harms the health and safety of low-income people of color.
In local plans, states should require covered municipalities to identify
sites for new affordable housing development that are not isolated
from residential neighborhoods, that are not proximate to adverse
land uses, and that have reasonable access to amenities.181 These criteria should be expressly incorporated into the applicable statute. The
former requirement may seem harder to make objective than the latter two, but the means by which jurisdictions isolate multi-family housing from single-family neighborhoods are well known. Specifically, the
law should require the identification of sites that are not separated
from single-family neighborhoods by major roads, train tracks, industrial or commercial zones, or large parks. Small parks or two-lane
roads may not raise the same issues. The necessary second step that
follows site selection based on inclusive principles is rezoning. Without a requirement to ensure that selected sites are appropriately
zoned for housing with an affordable component, a site selection requirement is meaningless.
The type of planning process described above would give municipalities a substantial amount of ownership over the process of reducing exclusionary zoning. The implementation of such a policy may
still entail political controversy, but the magnitude of that furor may
be lessened over that which a process that solely empowers developers
might generate. Additionally, aside from the prospect of municipal
buy-in to the process, structuring state regulation of exclusionary zoning as a planning mandate allows state officials to sell the structure to
the electorate as being one that empowers localities. From a messaging stand point, it is helpful to return to the fundamental observations
that states have an obligation to eliminate exclusionary zoning at the
municipal level and that exclusionary local zoning is often unlawful.
Compared to the potential consequences of liability for violations of
the FHA, the loss of federal funds, or a stringent builder’s remedy, a
planning mandate with strong site selection and rezoning requirements is a clear “second-best” solution, even for resistant
municipalities.
2.

Focus on Very
Households

Low-Income

and

Extremely

Low-Income

From a fair housing perspective, this criterion of an effective state
regulatory regime is straightforward. In many regions across the coun181. See Monitor’s Report Regarding Implementation of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal for the Period of October 25, 2010 through
April 25, 2011, U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 06-CV-2860 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2011).
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try, non-Latino whites may comprise a relatively similar proportion of
the population making between 50% and 80% of AMI to that of African Americans and Latinos.182 At the same time, it is very unlikely
that, outside of areas with very small populations of people of color,
non-Latino whites will make up a similar proportion of the population
earning less than 50% of AMI as African Americans and Latinos.183
For example, in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, the AMI for
Fiscal Year 2015 is $109,200.184 The Census Bureau’s breakdown of
household income by race and ethnicity does not precisely match the
relevant percentiles of AMI for affordable housing eligibility, but the
data nonetheless paints a vivid picture. 21.1% of non-Latino white
households185 earn between $60,000 and $100,000 as opposed to
23.7% of African American households186 and 26.4% of Latino households.187 By contrast, 24.2% of non-Latino white households earn less
than $60,000188 as opposed to 46.3% of African American households189 and 44.5% of Latino households.190
With this knowledge of the importance of housing that is affordable
below 50% of AMI, it is critical that states suffuse their statutory regime with an attention to the needs of very low- and extremely lowincome housing. The specific points at which that attention should be
incorporated are (1) the allocation of regional housing need, (2) the
planning obligation of municipalities, and (3) the criteria for developers being able to assert a builder’s remedy. States should give municipalities a menu of actions that they could take to address very low- and
extremely low-income housing needs in the portions of their statutes
elaborating upon the planning mandate. Lastly, while a typical
builder’s remedy may allow a developer to qualify if it is proposing
housing that would be 20% affordable at 80% of AMI, a builder’s remedy that is sensitive to fair housing concerns could require developers
to build housing wherein 15% of units are affordable at 80% of AMI
and 5% are affordable at 50% of AMI.
182. SIMMS ET AL., supra note 125.
183. Id.
184. FY 2015 Income Limits, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il15/index.html.
185. 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table B19001H, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pa
ges/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
186. 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table B19001B, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pa
ges/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
187. 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table B19001I, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pa
ges/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
188. See source cited supra note 184.
189. See source cited supra note 185.
190. See source cited supra note 186.
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3. Require Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing
When done well, affirmative fair housing marketing can play an important role in ensuring that development results in integration in
practice, rather than merely in theory. Additionally, since many developers and municipalities are familiar with the HOME program’s affirmative marketing requirements, instilling those principles into
projects undertaken in connection with planning obligations should
be uncomplicated. On a related note, neither municipalities nor developers should impose residency preferences with respect to affordable units in housing constructed in conjunction with a state regulatory
regime. Residency preferences may violate the FHA and are likely to
undercut the effectiveness of affirmative fair housing marketing efforts because applicants reached by marketing efforts would not be
eligible for the housing under the terms of the preferences.
4. Prioritizing Enforcement by Advocates over Enforcement by
Developers
When the planning process breaks down and municipalities continue exclusionary policies, there will be a need for private enforcement. The state administrative agency has a stake in ensuring
compliance with the planning mandate but may face significant political hurdles to taking action against municipalities. Thus, without enforcement, any regulatory regime will crumble. That is the lesson of
Minnesota, which has a law that shares some operational characteristics with California, but lacks meaningful enforcement provisions,
such as a builder’s remedy or a private right of action and prevailing
party attorney’s fees for community-based organizations and other
housing advocates.
States should design their laws with the goal of empowering advocacy organizations to serve as the primary private enforcers of the law.
They should do this by ensuring that the statute is written to recognize
the standing of advocacy organizations to challenge inadequate or
unimplemented municipal plans and by providing that prevailing
plaintiffs in challenges to local plans are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The statutory backdrop for California’s Housing
Element requirement puts advocates in a position to do this valuable
enforcement work.
Developers still have a role to play in enforcing the law through
builder’s remedy suits, particularly in rural or exurban areas with limited advocacy capacity to engage in public participation processes
around plans, but that role should be comparatively deemphasized.
The most effective way of doing so is simply to follow the recommendations above for empowering advocates to challenge plans in court.
If prevailing party attorney’s fees are available, such lawsuits may be
more practical for community-based organizations than intensive en-
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gagement in the planning process would be. Another, more novel way
of ensuring the continuing role of advocates in the enforcement process would be to statutorily recognize the right of advocates to intervene in builder’s remedy suits. In that event, if a developer is using the
enforcement mechanisms of a state law to pave the way for development at a site that, while located in a high opportunity community,
does not advance fair housing goals because of its adverse characteristics, the advocacy organization would be able to get those concerns
before a judge.
5. Strong Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
States should require local governments to maintain records documenting not just their compliance with the requirement to prepare
plans and rezone specified sites but also development that occurs on
those sites or on sites that are developed as a result of builder’s remedy lawsuits. Data maintained for reporting purposes on an annual
basis should include the number of developments proposed; the number of developments actually started; the number of developments
completed; the number of units by bedroom size for all developments;
any affordability restrictions that apply to units; application data in
relation to the Fair Housing Act’s protected characteristics; and occupancy data in relation to those same characteristics. This type of data
is necessary for determining whether developers and landlords are
meaningfully complying with affirmative marketing requirements,
gauging whether the location of affordable housing is translating into
increased residential integration, and deciding what policy changes
might more effectively address barriers to affordable housing development in high opportunity areas.
IV. Grounding Reform in Current Political Reality
States can clearly learn important lessons from the experiences of
New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. Having those
models to point to as evidence of success should be a selling point for
other states that are considering reform. The current political and social context offers other strong arguments for the urgency of reform,
as well. Beyond the legal obligations of states as grantees of federal
housing and community development funds, moving to eliminate exclusionary zoning could mitigate the harmful effects of concentrated
poverty, serve valuable environmental goals, and facilitate the efforts
of employers outside of central cities to attract and retain diverse,
high-quality workforces. These are the types of arguments that should
be salient across a broad range of states. Clearly, it will be easier to
achieve reform in more politically progressive states, but the business
community may be interested in policies that enable more of their
workers to live closer to their jobs. The influence of the business com-
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munity in moderate and conservative states could be leveraged to support policies that further fair housing choice.191
Likewise, avoiding the concentration of affordable, multi-family
housing and distributing that housing more equitably across regions
has fiscal benefits. When the tax base of individual communities is
eroded over time, states and counties have to absorb the cost one way
or the other. Policies that encourage the concentration of poverty by
sealing off certain communities from affordable housing lead to reduced income tax revenue at the state level. As Patrick Sharkey’s
landmark book Stuck in Place demonstrates, childhood exposure to
concentrated poverty significantly reduces the future earnings of
individuals.192
With respect to environmental concerns, remediating exclusionary
zoning serves two important functions. First, allowing increased housing supply within the footprint of existing suburban communities and
creating a framework whereby any further removed municipality
would be subject to the same obligations should result in a reduction
in the demand for housing in outlying areas.193 Doing so would preserve open space. Second, enabling low-income people of color to live
closer to suburban and exurban job centers could further reduce
lengthy commutes.194 By grounding appeals for state oversight of local
zoning with respect to affordable housing in these types of concerns
as well as in states’ legal obligations, advocates should be able to make
a compelling case for change.
V. Building a Bridge toward a New Land Use Regulation Paradigm
As Section II of this article illustrates, the road to the current land
use regulatory context in the United States is a full century long. The
first six decades of that process took on the appearance of a headlong
191. Although policies like those outlined in this article have not been adopted
outside of more traditionally progressive states, the support of the business
community for some of these policies has been encouraging and may suggest the existence of receptive audiences in other states. See Michelle Chapman, Chamber Working to Preserve & Enhance State-Level Housing Production
Policies, GREATER BOS. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 17, 2011), http://bos
tonchamber.com/chamber-working-to-preserve-enhance-state-level-hous
ing-production-policies; In-Depth Case Studies, HOUSINGPOLICY.ORG (July 18,
2011), http://www.housingpolicy.org/toolbox/strategy/policies/employer
_assisted_housing.html?tierid=202 (detailing employer programs to support affordable housing, including in Georgia and Mississippi).
192. PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE 162 (2013).
193. See Rolf Pendall, Do Land-Use Controls Cause Sprawl?, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. B:
PLAN & DESIGN 555 (1999) (finding that land use controls “that mandate
low densities are found cumulatively to increase sprawl).
194. See Emily Badger, The Commuting Penalty of Being Poor and Black in Chicago,
CITYLAB (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2014/02/com
muting-penality-being-poor-and-black-chicago/8457 (noting the higher
commuting costs and longer commutes faced by African American Chicago
residents as a result of the spatial mismatch of jobs and housing).
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race toward exclusionary policies while the last four decades have
been marked by occasional but ultimately not transformative attempts
to press the brakes and restore balance. None of those attempts have
fundamentally reshaped how people in communities on the ground
think about land use regulation. As evidenced by the rhetoric of local
policy-makers like Westchester County Executive Rob Astorino, many
continue to see exclusionary zoning as something that is natural, inevitably local, and supportive of individual property rights. Of course,
both historically and theoretically, it is none of those things.
By initiating conversations about statutory reform, states can reorient the popular understanding of zoning to what it can and, under
federal law, must be. Zoning can be a tool for reducing households’
exposure to environmental harms. It can be a tool for ensuring that
workers have access to jobs and employers have access to workers. It
can be a tool for minimizing the cost of providing public services and
infrastructure. It can be a tool for protecting environmentally sensitive
areas. Zoning is, and always has been, a manifestation of the robust
powers of state governments, and not municipalities. If this conception of zoning informs public policy, through statutory reforms based
on existing models, zoning can be a tool for affirmatively furthering
fair housing.

